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INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
ON HOLD:
REVISITING THE BASEL BAN FROM A PHILIPPINE
PERSPECTIVE
RICHARD GUTIERREZ†
ABSTRACT
Nineteen years after the Basel Ban was adopted it still has not
garnered the necessary ratifications to enter into force. This article aims
to revisit the Basel Ban and understand it from the perspective of a
developing country, particularly the Philippines, and draw out possible
obstacles it faces in ratifying this instrument of international environmental
justice. In addition the article will review the major issues raised by those
opposed to the Basel Ban and verify if these concerns raised nineteen years
ago still hold true today.
This article has four main sections. The first section of this article
briefly looks at the roots of international environmental justice in domestic
environmental justice. The second section reviews the rise of toxic waste
trade in the 1980s and the eventual rise of the Basel Convention and the
Basel Ban. The article delves into the framework of the Basel Convention
and the Basel Ban, their weaknesses and the elements of environmental
justice found in both instruments.
The third part of the article examines the current landscape of the
Basel Ban from the perspective of a developing country, the Philippines.
The Philippines is similar to many developing countries, with its high
incidence of poverty and its own experience with illegal toxic waste trade.
The Philippine perspective is important because it was a party to the Basel
Convention when the Basel Ban was adopted. Thus, it is one of the
qualifying countries whose ratification is needed for the Basel Ban to enter
into force. Moreover, the Philippines is often cited as a case where the
Basel Ban could cause adverse impacts on the local recycling industry and
in turn affect national development.
In examining the Philippine context, the article focuses on the trade in
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used lead acid batteries (ULABs) and electronic waste (e-waste) and where
the country derives these wastes for its recycling industry. The article will
also examine the “anti-trade” arguments leveled against the Basel Ban
and the agreements that the Philippines has entered into to see the
precedents the government is following, if any.
The last section of this article is the conclusion. What is critical at
this point in the ongoing saga of the Basel Ban is for countries to reexamine the issues surrounding the Basel Ban, and see if the arguments of
the past still hold true. Undoubtedly, the Basel Ban has firmly left its mark
in international law. Whether it remains a paper tiger will depend on the
perseverance of developing countries to fight for this principle at the
international level and ratify the instrument, and its observance and
implementation nationally at the domestic level.
INTRODUCTION
The Basel Ban Amendment [the Basel Ban] has been hailed as a
triumph of international environmental justice by some sectors and
criticized by others as counterproductive to environmentally sound
management of hazardous wastes. Its role in international law, particularly
in the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal [Basel Convention] has been both polarizing and
empowering.
The Basel Ban has polarized developed countries such as the US and
Japan from developing countries in their steadfast opposition to it.
However, the Basel Ban has also greatly empowered developing countries
in asserting their sovereignty against toxic waste dumping and has forced
developed countries to re-evaluate their policies on toxic waste trade.
This section briefly looks into the principles that helped define the
Basel Ban.
Toxic Waste Dumping and Environmental Justice
The 1970s and 1980s were a period that saw heightened public
concern about hazardous waste in the United States (US) and in the world.1
The heightened awareness resulted in increasing public resistance to the
1. See Alan Andrews, Beyond the Ban – Can the Basel Convention adequately Safeguard the
Interests of the World’s Poor in the International Trade of Hazardous Waste?, 5/2 L. ENV’T & DEV. J.
167, 169–70 (2009), available at http://www.lead-journal.org/content/09167.pdf (“During the 1970s
and 1980s, an increasing awareness of the negative impacts of hazardous waste on human health and
the environment led to a proliferation of legislation relating to waste disposal in the domestic legal
regimes of developed countries.”).
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location of disposal sites for unwanted wastes, particularly those classified
as hazardous, and the appreciable increase in disposal costs for these types
of wastes.2 The advent of global trade combined with these two factors
helped push waste traders to seek cheap dumping sites around the world.
Toxic waste dumping from developed to poorer countries became a
major concern, due in part to highly publicized dumping cases. The case of
the Khian Sea, a barge transporting 14,000 tons of incinerator ash from
Pennsylvania that was refused entry to New Jersey, was one of the leading
cases in the 1980s.3
Another highly publicized case was the Koko Beach incident in 1987
wherein an Italian businessman, illegally exported 4,000 tonnes of
chemical waste (including 150 tons of polychlorinated biphenyl) from Italy
to Nigeria over an 18-month period resulting in the loss of lives and
environmental damage in the area.4
The logic of the waste export paradigm that defined the period was
given a voice by then World Bank Chief Economist Larry Summers, when
he issued an internal memo to his colleagues, stating that “the economic
logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is
impeccable. . . .”5 Mr. Summers defended his logic in the following
manner:
1) The measurement of the costs of health impairing pollution depends on the
foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point
of view a given amount of health impairing pollution should be done in the
country with lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest
wages. . . .
2. History of the Negotiations of the Basel Convention, BASEL CONVENTION,
http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/Overview/History/Overview/tabid/3405/Default.aspx (last visited
Feb. 17, 2014) [hereinafter History of Basel Convention].
3. When New Jersey authorities learned that the waste contained arsenic, cadmium, lead,
mercury, dioxin, and other toxins and was classified as hazardous waste, the Khian Sea’s entry was
refused. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), TRADE
MEASURES IN THE BASEL CONVENTION ON THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS OF
HAZARDOUS WASTES AND THEIR DISPOSAL 5 (May 27, 1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/
trade/envtrade/36789048.pdf. The vessel attempted to dock and unload its toxic cargo in six other
countries and was refused. Id. The barge then sailed to sea from 1984 to 1986, stopping at various
Caribbean ports failing to offload its cargo, before finally leaving some of its wastes cargo in Haiti,
with the rest assumed to have been dumped at sea. Id.; Peter Montague, Philadelphia Dumps on the
Poor, ENVTL. RES. FOUND., http://ban.org/ ban_news/philly_dumps.html.
4. See Edna Eguh, Regulations of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes: Lessons
from Koko, 9 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 130, 130–32 (1997) (describing Koko incident and its
consequences).
5. Internal Memorandum from Larry Summers at World Bank (Dec. 12, 1991), available at
http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/document/ec47401/6865.pdf.
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2) The costs of pollution are likely to be non-linear as the initial increments
of pollution probably have very low cost. I’ve always though that underpopulated countries in Africa are vastly under-polluted, their air quality is
probably vastly inefficiently low compared to Los Angeles or Mexico
City. . . .
3) The demand for a clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons is
likely to have a very high-income elasticity.6

The undercurrent of Summers’ logic is the recognition of inequalities
in the world and to take full advantage of them. In the realm of toxic waste
trade, there was and continues a clear divide between developed and poorer
countries from environmental and labor standards to technical capacity and
other social elements.
In the 1970’s and the decades following, only a handful of
industrialized or developed countries produce 95% of the world’s toxic
wastes.7 Much of the toxic waste trade occurs among developed countries,
where the waste originated. However, significant portion of the trade have
found their way to developing countries.8 Thus, the Khian Sea, Koko
Beach, and similar toxic waste dumping cases echoed the inequalities faced
by poorer countries and the growing threat of toxic waste in the global
environment.
The experience of poorer countries with respect to toxic waste
dumping was happening in conjunction with the experience of poor
communities and people of color in the US. It was during this period that
the environmental justice movement emerged in the US, which was
“started by individuals, primarily people of color, who sought to address
the inequity of environmental protection in their communities.”9
The environmental justice movement in the US can be seen as an
important milestone in the development of international environmental
justice as the movement and the principle shared common themes and
struggles.10 And as Lawrence Summers’ remarks defined the economic
logic of toxic waste dumping, the environmental justice movement in the
US helped contribute in defining the environmental justice principle at the
6. Id.
7. JENNIFER CLAPP, TOXIC EXPORTS: THE TRANSFER OF HAZARDOUS WASTES FROM RICH TO
POOR COUNTRIES 22 (2001).
8. Id. at 2.
9. Basic information on Environmental Justice, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/environmental
justice/basics/ejbackground.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
10. Cf. RUCHI ANAND, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NORTH-SOUTH
DIMENSION 15 (2004) (analogizing the United States and international environmental justice
movements).
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international level.
In 1994, the principle of environmental justice was institutionalized in
the US when President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12898 (EO).11
According to the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
environmental justice is “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of
all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect
to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental
laws, regulations, and policies.”12
The EPA’s definition encompasses two sets of action: fair treatment
and meaningful involvement.
“Fair treatment means that no group of people should bear a
disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences
resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial operations or
policies. Meaningful involvement means that: (1) people have an
opportunity to participate in decisions about activities that may affect their
environment and/or health; (2) the publics [sic] contribution can influence
the regulatory agency’s decision; (3) their concerns will be considered in
the decision making process; and (4) the decision makers seek out and
facilitate the involvement of those potentially affected.”13
Other authors describe these two elements as: distributive justice and
procedural justice.14
Distributive justice deals with “inequitable
distribution of social, economic, and political burdens on
people/communities with different levels of development.”15 Procedural
justice
highlights
the
“inequitable
bargaining
powers
of
people/communities with different levels of economic development,”
regarding environmental benefits and burdens, and recognizes that racial
minorities and the poor are often not included or are ignored in such
conversations.16
In spite of the difference in terminologies, these very principles have
found their way at the global level, particularly in international multilateral
agreements, such as the Basel Convention.17
11. Exec. Order. No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
12. EPA, supra note 9.
13. Id. (emphasis removed).
14. Lisa Widawsky, In My Backyard: How Enabling Hazardous Waste Trade To Developing
Nations Can Improve the Basel Convention’s Ability to Achieve Environmental Justice, 38 ENVTL. L.
577, 583 (2008).
15. ANAND, supra note 10, at 10.
16. Id.
17. See Widawsky, supra note 14, at 585 (“Examples of procedural and distributive injustice
pervade the discourse among industrialized and developing nations, and political solutions in the form
of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) echoing the themes of environmental justice and

Gutierrez (Do Not Delete)

12/4/2014 7:11 PM

404

[Vol. XXIV:399

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

I. THE BASEL CONVENTION AND THE BASEL BAN
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal18 (Basel Convention) was initiated
in response to the numerous international scandals regarding hazardous
waste trafficking in the 1980s.19
The Basel Convention negotiations were “politicized, arduous and
emotionally charged.”20 In the tense negotiations the undercurrent of
environmental justice was present as two competing ideologies vied for
control of the direction of the Convention: the pro-trade camp and those
calling for a total ban on toxic waste exports. Developed countries, Japan,
US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, known as the JUSCANZ, with
their developing country allies, led the pro-trade side. On the other, the
Group of 77 developing countries led by China, and supported by the
European Union bloc of countries fought for an outright ban.
The negotiations started in 1987 and concluded on March 22, 1989
with 35 states signing the Convention in Basel, Switzerland.21 To date, 181
countries have ratified the treaty.22
A. Basel Convention
1. The Convention’s Framework. The Basel Convention seeks to
minimize the generation23 and exportation of hazardous wastes,24 and to
promote national self-sufficiency in hazardous waste management by
placing responsibility on toxic waste generators to dispose of the wastes as
close to area of generation as possible.25 In its efforts at minimizing waste
exports, the Basel Convention also restricts traffic in toxic wastes by
attempting to rectify these injustices have been forged.”).
18. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Basel Convention], available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1992/05/19920505%2012-51%20PM/Ch_XXVII_03p.pdf.
19. History of Basel Convention, supra note 2.
20. Katharina Kummer, The Basel Convention: Ten Years On, 7 REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L
ENVL. L. 227, 227 (1998).
21. For a full list of signatories, see Parties to the Basel Convention, BASEL CONVENTION,
http://www.basel.int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/Parties/tabid/1290/ Default.aspx (last visited Feb.
17, 2014) [hereinafter Signatories to Basel Convention].
22. Id.
23. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 4(2)(a).
24. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 4(2)(d).
25. Basel Convention, supra note 18, arts. 4(2)(b) and 4(10).
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applying the “Prior Informed Consent” or PIC procedure,26 and prohibiting
waste trade with countries not parties to the Basel Convention.27
Shipments made without the proper notification and consent of the
importing Party or when the shipment does not conform in a material way
with the shipping documents, are deemed illegal.28 Illegal traffic under the
Basel Convention is a criminal act.29
It is important to note that the Basel Convention framework only
applies to toxic and other wastes.30 Waste is defined by the Convention as
“any substances or objects which are disposed of or are intended to be
disposed of or are required to be disposed of by the provisions of national
law.”31 The Basel Convention is unique because it defines wastes without
considering economic value or use of the substance and places emphasis on
the fact of disposal or intent to dispose of the substance. Disposal is
defined in Annex IV of the Convention and includes recycling,
reclamation, and other processes.32
Elements of distributive justice and procedural justice are present in
the Basel Convention. The PIC procedure on the importation of waste is
an important element of procedural justice, as it allows countries,
regardless of economic stature, to be notified and consent to or reject any
toxic waste importation or exportation. Other procedural justice elements
that are found in Basel are:
 Information sharing provisions33 and a mandate for
cooperation34 – countries are mandated to cooperate in
monitoring the management of hazardous wastes35 and in
developing technical guidelines and codes of practice for
environmentally sound management of wastes, 36 send
26. See Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 6 (establishing prior informed consent
requirement).
27. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 4(5).
28. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 9(1).
29. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 4(3).
30. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 1.
31. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 2(1).
32. Wastes are considered toxic under Basel if it is included in a category of waste under Annex I
of the Convention, e.g. clinical wastes. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 1(1)(a). If the suspected
waste, however, is found in Annex I, but does not exhibit a specific characteristic that the Parties to the
Convention deemed hazardous, as listed in Annex III, e.g. poisonous, flammable solids, then that waste
is not considered hazardous. Id. art. 1(1)(b).
33. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 13.
34. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 10.
35. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 10(b).
36. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 10(e).

Gutierrez (Do Not Delete)

12/4/2014 7:11 PM

406

[Vol. XXIV:399

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

information on their national definitions of wastes37, decisions
to ban or limit entry of hazardous wastes38, among other
information.
 Participation at Conference of Parties (COP) and allowing
observers.39 Developing countries are able participate in COP
adding their voice in strengthening and developing the
Convention. To accomplish this the Convention has created a
provision where financial support is given to developing
countries to attend and participate.40 Notably, the Convention
also makes room for non-parties and non-state parties, such as
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), industry, and other
stakeholders to participate as observers under specific rules.41
 The right to vote42 – regardless of economic status, countries
party to the Convention has 1 vote and decisions by the
Convention pass by consensus.43
On distributive justice, the obligation to manage a country’s own toxic
waste within its own border,44 the explicit recognition of disparity between
developed and developing countries45 are some of the indicators of the
Convention’s consciousness of the plight of developing countries. To
further minimize the disproportionate impact of waste dumping on
developing countries, the Basel Convention further installed measures such
as the criminalization of illegal trade in hazardous wastes,46 and provisions
of transfer of technology to developing countries through centers called
Basel Convention Regional Centers.47
2. Weaknesses of the Basel Convention. For NGOs and the developing
countries that fought for a trade ban, the resulting treaty was a failure.
Instead of establishing an outright toxic waste ban, the Basel Convention
was seen as a means of legalizing toxic waste trade.48 “Thus the original
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 13(2)(b).
Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 13(2)(d).
Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 15.
Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 15 (3).
Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 15(6).
Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 24.
Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 24(1).
Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 4(2)(b).
Basel Convention, supra note 18, pmbl. ¶ 20.
Basel Convention, supra note 18, arts. 4(3), 9(1).
Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 14(1).
BASEL ACTION NETWORK, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 1: THE BASEL BAN A TRIUMPH FOR GLOBAL
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Convention became primarily an instrument to monitor the transboundary
movements of hazardous waste rather than prevent it. With the exception
of a ban on exports to Antarctica, the Convention established only a weak
control regime based on the principle of PIC.”49
i. Gaps in the PIC procedure. As the core measure of control under
the Basel Convention, the PIC procedure has three critical weaknesses that
have raised concerns over Basel’s effectiveness in minimizing toxic waste
dumping. First, the PIC procedure fundamentally fails to ensure that the
exporting country verifies that the facility accepting the waste in the
importing country can manage the waste in an environmentally sound
manner.50 Under the Convention each party has the obligation to ensure
the availability of adequate disposal facilities in the importing state.51
However, the obligation does not prescribe a process nor designate an
entity that will conduct the verification. The Convention thus relies on
self-verification by countries and without any standard process or
independent entity to conduct the verification, the adequacy of sufficiently
determining if a facility is environmentally sound is difficult to achieve.
Compounding the lack of a prescribed process is the fact that the
technical guidelines generated under the Convention are not mandatory at
the local or national levels. The guidelines are merely prescriptive of
environmentally sound management (ESM) technologies and processes,
and Basel parties have the discretion to adopt these ESM guidelines. Thus,
in the absence of a standard process for verification, a country attempting
to self-verify a facility cannot assume that the destination country is
observing the Basel ESM guidelines for a specific waste.
Another weakness in the PIC procedure is its omission to account for
the susceptibility of country consents to be obtained from corrupt local
officials.52 It also ignores the economic motivation of poor countries to
accept these types of wastes for either the value or money that the waste
can contribute to the local economy.53
ii. Recycling Loophole. The “Recycling Loophole” is based on Article
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (2012), available at http://ban.org/library/briefing1.html [hereinafter BAN
NO. 1].
49. Jim Puckett, The Basel Ban: A Triumph Over Business-As-Usual, BASEL ACTION NETWORK
(last updated Oct. 1, 1997), available at http://ban.org/about_basel_ban /jims_article.html.
50. See Widawsky, supra note 14, at 582 (“[T]he loophole in the PIC process currently enabling
misrepresentation by Parties regarding [environmentally sound management] practices could be closed
by predicating use of a facility in a developing nation upon prior inspection and authorization by an
implementation body.”).
51. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 4(2)(b).
52. Andrews, supra note 1, at 173.
53. Id. at 173–74.
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4(9)(b) of the Basel Convention which allows transboundary movement of
wastes if these are required as a raw material for recycling or recovery
industries in the importing state. There was a concern among NGOs and
developing countries that waste trade will follow the recycling loophole
under the Convention.
The international environmental group,
Greenpeace, reported that by early 1990s after the Convention entered into
force, 90% of waste destined for final disposal shifted instead and headed
to recycling or further use.54 The Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) also cited an increase in their member countries
waste export for recycling, from 50.2% in 1992 to 58.4% in 1993.55
The Basel Action Network, a Basel Convention NGO watchdog,
classifies the waste trade recycling practices either as: sham – “where
wastes are not really recycled at all, but simply burned or dumped,” or dirty
– “which involves polluting operations that jeopardize the health of the
importing country’s populace and environment.”56 In 2002, the group
publicized its investigation on the sham or dirty recycling of electronic
waste or e-waste from the US to China.57 Other civil society groups have
also documented egregious recycling practices over the years, including the
disposal of ships that are have reached the end of their useful life or have
been mandated by law to be decommissioned, or end-of-life vessels.58
iii. Environmentally Sound Management. Environmentally sound
management is a critical principle in the Basel Convention framework, as it
functions as both a goal and obligation by parties to the Convention. The
Basel Convention defines environmentally sound management as “taking
all practicable steps to ensure that hazardous wastes or other wastes are
managed in a manner which will protect human health and the environment
against the adverse effects which may result from such wastes.”59
This definition has been criticized as vague and open to subjective
interpretations and has been seen as one of the reasons for the difficulty of
enforcing the obligation of parties that wastes can be exported only if

54. CLAPP, supra note 7, at 58 (footnotes omitted).
55. Id. (footnotes omitted).
56. BASEL ACTION NETWORK, HAZARDOUS WASTE RECYCLING: NO JUSTIFICATION FOR TOXIC
TRADE
1
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ban.org/wp-content/uploads/2011
/10/BP7_Oct_2011_Final_Letter.pdf.
57. BASEL ACTION NETWORK & SILICON VALLEY TOXICS COALITION, EXPORTING HARM: THE
HIGH-TECH
TRASHING
OF
ASIA
(2002),
available
at
http://www.ban.org/Ewaste/technotrashfinalcomp.pdf.
58. Problems and Solutions, NGO SHIPBREAKING PLATFORM, http://www.shipbreakingplatform.
org/problems-and-solutions/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
59. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 2(8).
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disposed of in an “environmentally sound manner”.60
The subjectivity of the ESM definition is also seen as a means of
stripping the Basel Convention of its environmental justice roots.61 Some
sectors are defining ESM “only in terms of technical capacity and only at
the facility level, and does not embody the fundamental Basel policies,
such as the fact that waste generation should be minimized and that it is not
ESM to externalize costs of pollution via export to poorer countries rather
than deal with them at source through national self-sufficiency.”62
iv. Liability Protocol in Limbo. Another weakness that has been
attributed to the Basel Convention is its lack of provision for liability and
compensation for toxic waste contamination.63 The closest response by the
Basel Parties was to develop the Protocol on Liability and Compensation
(Protocol),64 which was adopted in December of 1999. Fifteen years after
its adoption it is not yet in force, and has garnered only 11 of 20 needed
ratifications.
The Protocol covers damages arising from incidents occurring “during
a transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and other wastes and their
disposal, including illegal traffic, from the point where the wastes are
loaded on the means of transport in an area under the national jurisdiction
of a State of export.” 65 Damages under the Protocol include: loss of life or
personal injury, loss of or damage to property, loss of income, costs of
reinstatement and preventive measures.66
The main strengths of the Protocol are the strict liability and faultbased liability provisions it has set up for waste shipments. Under the strict
liability provisions liability for damages is generally assigned to the state of
export or exporter, and to the state of import in specific cases, arising from
the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes until the disposer has
taken possession of the waste, at which point the disposer will be held
liable.67 The fault-based liability element of the Protocol applies to any
person who causes or contributes to an accident by ignoring Basel
60. CLAPP, supra note 7, at 57.
61. BASEL ACTION NETWORK, RUNNING FROM BASEL: HOW THE CONVENTION IS DELIBERATELY
UNDERMINED 1 (2012), available at http://www.ban.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/BP8_Sept2012
Final_A4.pdf.
62. Id. at 2.
63. CLAPP, supra note 7, at 57.
64. Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Dec. 10, 1999, UNEP/CHW.1/WG/1/9/2,
available at http://archive.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop5/docs /prot-e.pdf.
65. Id. art. 3(1).
66. Id. art. 2(2)(c).
67. Id. art. 4(1),(2).
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Convention requirements or through wrongful intentional, reckless, or
negligent acts will be held liable for damages.68
Developed and developing countries, including NGOs, have been
lukewarm in accepting the Protocol. A reason for this is that the, liability
for the shipment will not cover so-called “after-care incidences” such as
leaks or seepage at waste storage sites.69 Major costs of clean-up and
remediation are borne by the State of import. For developing countries who
are often at the receiving end of toxic waste exports this is an unwanted
economic and technical burden. Depending on the hazards involved, the
technical capacity of cleaning up and remediating the hazards might not be
available in the country. In these cases, developing countries often seek out
developed country assistance.
Another downside of the Protocol is the exclusion of waste generators
from the strict liability provisions. The exclusion is seen as an incentive for
waste exporters to hand over their waste to export brokers or other
“notifiers” who would assume liability for the shipments who could easily
escape or minimize liability.70 For instance, the “notifier” assuming the
liability of the waste export may be under capitalized which will
immediately limit its exposure to pay out any claims for damage arising
from any incident.
Developed nations, particularly the US, were uncomfortable with the
Protocol primarily on the provisions for minimum liability thresholds
imposing a high limit, which could impact trade in nondangerous
recyclable wastes.71
B.

The Basel Ban Amendment (the Basel Ban)
The increase in toxic waste exports after the adoption of the Basel
Convention, and the emergence of the loopholes in the Convention, pressed
both developing countries and environmental NGOs to call for a trade ban
on hazardous wastes outside of the Convention.72 As a result, several
regional agreements were born at the wake of the Convention: Lomé IV
Convention in 1989,73 Bamako Convention in 1991,74 Agreement on the
68. Id. art. 5.
69. Saving the Basel Liability Protocol, BASEL ACTION NETWORK, at II,
http://ban.org/subsidiary/liability10.html.
70. Id. at I.
71. Daniel Pruzin, Hazardous Waste agreement on Liability Protocol Reached at Basel
Conference of Parties, 22 INT’L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 973 (Dec. 8, 1999), available at
www.ban.org/ban_news/hazardous3.html.
72. CLAPP, supra note 7, at 67.
73. Forth ACP-EEC Convention, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 385, available at http://unctad.org
/Sections/dite/iia/docs/compendium/en/44%20volume%202.pdf.
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Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes in the Central American
Region 1992,75 Waigani Convention in 1995,76 and Izmir Protocol in
1996.77
Within the Basel Convention, efforts to push for trade bans continued
as well. At the first Conference of Parties in Piriapolis, Uruguay on
December 1992, Decision I/22 was adopted requesting developing
countries to prohibit the import of hazardous wastes from industrialized
countries.78
In March 1994, at COP2, a tense and political contest between
JUSCANZ and the G-77 with the EU countries resulted in Decision II/12.79
This decision explicitly prohibited export of all hazardous wastes from
OECD to non-OECD countries including exports for recycling ore
recovery operations as of January 1, 1998.80 Decision II/12 attempted to
address a major loophole under Basel and was a major assertion of both
procedural and distributive justice by developing countries at the global
stage.
Decision II/12, however, gave rise to further questions, particularly
involving its legal status and enforceability paving the way for another
showdown between JUSCANZ and the G-77 and EU in COP3.
In September 1995, COP3 of the Basel Convention was held in
Geneva, Switzerland. The contest between JUSCANZ and G-77 and the
EU was coming to a head. Both sides understood the level of importance
of what was to be decided at COP3 that in order for Decision II/12, which
74. Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import to Africa and the Control of Transboundary
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Jan. 31, 1991, 2101 U.N.T.S. 177,
available at http://www.cetim.ch/en/documents/conv-bamako-ang.pdf.
75. Regional Agreement on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, Dec. 11, 1992,
available at http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/RecordDetails ?id=TRE-001167&index=treaties.
76. Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and
Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous
Wastes within the South Pacific Region, Sept. 16, 1995, 2161 U.N.T.S. 91, available at
http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/Waigani%20Convention%20
Text.pdf.
77. Protocol on the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Jan. 10, 1996, available at
http://www.unep.ch/regionalseas/main/med/medhaz.html.
78. First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Piriapolis, Uru., Dec. 3–4, 1992,
Decision I/22, 37-38, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.1/24, available at http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/
ConferenceoftheParties/ReportsandDecisions/tabid/3303/Default.aspx.
79. Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Geneva, Switz., Mar. 21–25,
1994, Decision II/12, 19-20, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.2/30, available at http://www.basel.int/The
Convention/ConferenceoftheParties/ReportsandDecisions/tabid /3303/Default.aspx.
80. Id. §§ 1–2.
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has been restated in Decision III/1,81 to be implemented it had to become
integral to the Convention. Thus, amending the Basel Convention was
necessary.
At the end of the highly contentious meeting, the political tight rope
was crossed. The G-77 nations prevailed and Decision III/1 or what has
come to be known as the Basel Ban was adopted by consensus.82
1. The Basel Ban’s Framework. Decision III/1 or the Basel Ban
prohibits Annex VII countries (nations that are part of the OECD,
European Community, and the special mention of Liechtenstein) from
exporting hazardous wastes to non-Annex VII countries for final disposal
and for wastes intended for recycling or recovery.83
In addition to the prevention of waste dumping on poorer countries,
the Basel Ban is also designed to bolster the Basel Convention’s goal of
minimizing toxic waste generation. 84The Basel Ban attempts to
accomplish this by preventing the movement of waste, forcing waste
generating countries to increase their self-sufficiency in managing their
waste, which includes minimizing toxic inputs in production and
processes.85
The Basel Ban has several key features in relation to international
environmental justice.
First the Basel Ban attempted to further embed within the treaty the
principle of distributive justice by adding a new preambular paragraph to
the Basel Convention, confirming the inequality between rich and poorer
nations on the issue of hazardous waste management. The proposed
amendment states:
“Recognizing that transboundary movements of hazardous wastes,
especially to developing countries, have a high risk of not constituting an
environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes as required by
this Convention;”
Second, considering the fact that in that period at least 95% of the
81. Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Geneva, Switz., Sept. 18–22,
1995, Decision III/1, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.3/35, available at http://www.basel.int/Implementation/
LegalMatters/BanAmendment/tabid/1484/Default.aspx [hereinafter Basel Ban].
82. Note at the meeting India, Brazil, South Korea, and Russia sided with the JUSCANZ. See
CLAPP, supra note 7, at 76 (“[F]or the first time, some non-OECD governments, including those of
Brazil, India, Russia, and South Korea, also expressed opposition to the adoption of a ban
amendment.”).
83. Basel Ban, supra note 81, § 3.
84. BAN NO.1, supra note 48.
85. See id.
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waste trade generators were from rich nations, the developing country
proponents and their NGO allies tried to further concretize the
differentiation of roles between richer and poorer nations by creating the
category of Annex VII and non-Annex VII countries.
Third, the fact that Decision III/1 was even possible and passed
through the Basel proceedings, in spite of strong resistance from several
developed nations such as the US and Japan, affirmed that the procedural
justice component of the Basel Convention is functioning.
2. Major Weaknesses of the Basel Ban. The Basel Ban has received its
fair share of criticisms. These can be grouped into three categories: trade,
development, and implementation.
The trade argument against the Basel Ban rests on two planks: a) that
it is inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
/ World Trade Organization (WTO) rules; and b) legitimate trade on
recyclable materials will be controlled as hazardous waste potentially
stifling the trade.86
Another major argument against the Basel Ban is that it impinges on a
country’s national development by restricting needed supply of raw
materials and source of income, especially for developing countries. By
denying access to raw materials or from foreign sources, developing
country facilities could eventually close down and the valuable materials in
the hazardous wastes would end up in final disposal.87 Put another way,
this argument posits that a ban on recycling hazardous wastes will
discourage recycling and result in more use of virgin materials thus
creating more environmental damage.
Corollary to the national
development argument is the loss of jobs and earnings from the affected
recycling sector.
The lack of support from developed countries, particularly the nonEuropean developed nations: US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and
South Korea is cited as a critical weakness of the Basel Ban. “Any
measure that does not bind such an important group of countries is of
limited value.”88
3. The Country Led Initiative (CLI). The competing interests over the
Basel Ban Amendment defined the agenda of work of the Basel

86. CLAPP, supra note 7, at 83; see also Widawsky, supra note 14, at 614.
87. See Widawsky, supra note 14, at 614 (noting that “reclamation not only provides income for
these countries but also puts materials into use that would otherwise be sitting at a disposal site”).
88. Andrews, supra note 1, at 180.
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Convention and it often ended up in a political and legal deadlock. A
procedural hump that further complicated the Basel Ban issue was the
vagueness of the Basel Convention on how it should be amended. 89
Article 17(5) of the Convention on amendments was not clear, particularly
the numerical basis of the three-fourth’s voting requirement. The
interpretation of Article 17(5) has a direct bearing on the number of votes
needed before an amendment could come into force.90 Thus, in addition to
overcoming the challenge of getting the needed ratification, the parties to
the Convention had to agree on the process of resolving the issue and what
the correct interpretation of the Article 17(5) provision should be while
navigating the political minefield that has permeated the Basel Ban
debates.
In 2008, at Bali, Indonesia, the President of the ninth meeting of the
Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, called for a process to
explore means to break the impasse to finally move the Basel Ban
objectives forward.91
In response to the call, Indonesia and Switzerland organized the effort
called “Country-Led Initiative” (CLI), where they invited key countries, to
discuss in an informal, dynamic and non-dogmatic manner those issues
related to the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, especially to
developing countries, contrary to the overarching objective of the Basel
Ban.92
89. See Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 17(5).
90. See Basel Convention Amendments – History, Basel Convention, http://www.basel.int/
Default.aspx?tabid=2760#section2 (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (noting that ambiguity arises in
determining the particular percentage of votes needed to ratify or amend and that “‘it is necessary to be
aware of the total number of States concerned from which the required percentage will be calculated’”).
There were two competing interpretations on Art. 17(5). The first interpretation was called the “fixed
time” approach. Id. This interpretation considers the number of parties present and voting in 1995
when the Basel Ban Amendment was adopted. Id. The main disagreement in this interpretation was
whether the actual number of parties present at the time of the adoption or the total number of parties to
the Basel Convention in 1995 would be the basis. See id. (“It is only when a treaty specifies that the
percentage should be calculated based upon the number of parties at the time of adoption of an
amendment that the depositary, in compliance with the treaty itself, can adopt the ‘fixed time
approach.’ . . . [However,] [i]n the present case, article 17(5) of the Convention does not specify that
the percentages should be calculated at the time of adoption . . . .”). The other line of interpretation was
from the UN Office of Legal Affairs, which utilized the “current time” approach. Id. This approach
stipulates that the number of ratifications required for entry into force will be calculated on the basis of
the percentage of the Parties at the time each ratification is deposited. Id.
91. See Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal on its Ninth Meeting, Bali, Indon., June 23–27,
2008, 51–52 U.N. DOC. UNEP/CHW.9/39, available at
http://www.basel.int/Portals/
4/Basel%20Convention/docs/meetings/cop/cop9/docs/39e-rep.pdf#ix26 (reproducing the “President’s
statement on the possible way forward on the Ban Amendment”).
92. Basel Convention Implementation – The Country-Led Initiative, BASEL CONVENTION,
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A key output from the CLI was a draft omnibus decision that became
the basis for Decision 10/3,93 which was adopted as a decision at the tenth
meeting of the Conference of the Parties in 2011.94
Decision 10/3 interpreted Article 17(5) stating that:
[A]cceptance of three-fourths of those parties that were parties at the
time of the adoption of the amendment is required for the entry into force
of such amendment, noting that such an interpretation of paragraph 5 of
Article 17 does not compel any party to ratify the Ban Amendment.95

With the Basel parties resolving the roadblock to ratification, the CLI
effort led to 7 country ratifications 3 years since its passage.96 The
adoption of the “fixed time” approach at COP 10 means that 66 countries
are needed to ratify the Basel Ban for it to enter into force, and as of this
writing, it is 16 ratifications away.97
II. THE BASEL BAN IN 2014: FROM A PHILIPPINE PERSPECTIVE
As the Basel Ban moves closer to its entry into force, it is critical to
http://www.basel.int/Implementation/LegalMatters/CountryLedInitiative/tabid/1339/Default.aspx#Live
Content[decision10-3] (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal on its Tenth Meeting, Cartagena, Colom., Oct. 17–
21,
2011,
31,
U.N. DOC.
UNEP/CHW.10/28
(Nov.
1,
2011),
available
at
http://archive.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop10/documents/28e.pdf (emphasis added).
96. See Basel Convention - Ban Amendment to the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal Geneva, 22 September 1995,
BASEL CONVENTION, http://www.basel.int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/Ban Amendment/tabid/
1344/Default.aspx (last visited April. 19, 2014). The following countries submitted their instruments of
accession, acceptance or ratification after Nov. 1, 2011: Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guatemala, Lesotho,
Malta, Monaco, and Saudi Arabia.
97. There were 87 parties to the Basel Convention in 1995 when the Basel Ban was adopted.
Following the fixed-time approach, three-fourths of those 87 parties, 66, would need to ratify the Basel
Ban in order for it to enter into force. See at: file:///Users/Rich/Downloads/UNEP-CHW-BAN-OLADepositaryLetter19032013.Engl ish.pdf (last visited April 19, 2014). The following are the prospective
countries that have not yet ratified the Basel Ban Amendment, and whose ratification counts toward the
Amendment entering into force: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Brazil,
Canada, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Dem. Rep. of Congo, El Salvador, Estonia, Guinea,
India, Iran, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Malawi, Maldives, Mexico, Namibia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Senegal, Seychelles, St. Kitt and Nevis, South
Africa, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. See id. This list is based on the comparison of the UN
Office of Legal Affairs 1995 list of countries and the current ratification lists under the Basel
Convention.(highlighting those countries who have yet to ratify the Basel Ban).
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revisit the Basel Ban in the reality that faces developing countries to
understand the arguments raised against it that could dissuade the
Philippines and other countries from ratifying an international instrument
whose main purpose is to prevent toxic waste dumping on poorer nations.
A.

The Philippines
The Philippines is a representative country for developing nations on
the issue of the Basel Ban. It shares similarities with other developing
countries, for instance, with a population surpassing 105 million, 26.5% of
it population is under the poverty line, it ranks 54th among highly indebted
nations, and 51.5% of its GDP goes into servicing its foreign debt.98 The
Philippine public sector is highly perceived as corrupt. In 2013, the
Philippines ranked 94th with a score of 36, from a corruption ranking
issued by the international NGO, Transparency International, which scores
countries from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (no corruption).99
On the issue of toxic waste, the Philippines became a party to the
Convention on March 10, 1993. It has not ratified the Basel Ban. The
country has also experienced illegal toxic waste shipments and toxic
exports. In 1994, a Japanese shipbuilding company developed an industrial
zone in Southern Philippines to dismantle end-of-life vessels contaminated
with toxins, with no effective measures to prevent pollution.100 In 1999,
Philippine authorities in the Port of Manila intercepted 124 seagoing
containers of medical waste, in the guise of recycled paper, from Japan.101
The Philippines also has a special connection with the Basel Ban.
First, it is one of the countries that belong to the 1995 list of parties to the
Basel Convention whose ratification is crucial in bringing the Basel Ban
into force. Second, Philippine lawmakers were outraged over the growing
toxic waste trade, which they called a “diabolical practice” that they
responded unilaterally by passing a law banning the import, storage, or
transport of nuclear or toxic wastes in or through the Philippines.102 And
98. The World Factbook – Philippines, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2014).
http://www.trans
99. Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
parency.org/country#PHL (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). Compared to its Southeast Asian neighbors, the
Philippines would be in middle of the pack with Singapore being the least corrupt with a rank of 5th
followed by Brunei (38th) and Malaysia (53th) but it is ahead of Thailand (102nd), Indonesia (114th),
Vietnam (116th), Laos (140th) Myanmar (157th), and Cambodia (160th).
100. BASEL ACTION NETWORK, JPEPA AS A STEP IN JAPAN’S GREATER PLAN TO LIBERALIZE
HAZARDOUS WASTE TRADE IN ASIA 9 (2007), available at http://ban.org/library/JPEPA_
Report_BAN_FINAL_29_Aug_071.pdf.
101. Id.
102. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN WASTES: A GREENPEACE INVENTORY, 1990; see also An Act
to Control Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes, Providing Penalties for Violations
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third, the country’s importation from Australia of used lead acid batteries
as raw materials for its facility has oft been cited as an example of why the
Basel Ban can adversely impact local recycling industries in developing
countries.
In the succeeding section, we will look at the Philippine situation and
examine whether the weaknesses or faults attributed to the Basel Ban has
and continues to impact the prospects of the country ratifying the Basel
Ban.
B.

Obstacles to Ratifying the Basel Ban
1. Anti-Trade Measure. The “anti-trade” measure argument against
the Basel Ban must be seen in light of the WTO principles and agreements.
A fundamental principle that the WTO members follow is that countries
must facilitate free trade by removing both tariff and non-tariff barriers to
trade.103
Specifically, GATT Article XI(1) requires its members not to employ
prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges on the
importation of any product from another member country or on the
exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of
another member. This is a clear proscription against the practice of export
and import bans on industrial goods. The Philippines became part of the
WTO in January 1, 1995.
Considering GATT Article XI(1), the Basel Ban is indeed a measure
to restrict or control trade, particularly for hazardous wastes.
The fact that a measure can indeed be characterized as or contain
provisions that could be construed as “anti-trade” did not dissuade the
Philippine government from ratifying multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs) with such elements.
On July 17, 1991, four years before the Basel Ban, the Philippines
ratified the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer
(Montreal Protocol).104 The Montreal Protocol is a landmark international
Thereof, and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 6969, § 13, (Oct. 26, 1990) (Phil.), available at
http://www.pctc.gov.ph/initiatv/RepAct6969.htm.
103. See Understanding the WTO: Basics – Principles of the Trading System, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014)
(“Lowering trade barriers is one of the most obvious means of encouraging trade.”).
104. See generally Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%
201522/volume-1522-I-26369-English.pdf [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; Status of Ratification for
the Montreal Protocol and the Vienna Convention, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, (Nov. 12, 2013),
http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/treaty_ratification_status.php. Note that The Vienna Convention on
Protection of Ozone Layer (1985) established the framework for the creation of the Montreal Protocol.
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agreement designed to protect the stratospheric ozone layer. The Protocol
requires each party to ratchet-down its respective production and
consumption of Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) following the time
frame stated in the Protocol, with the ultimate goal of global elimination of
ODS.105 The Protocol also requires all Parties to ban exports and imports
of controlled substances from and to non-Parties.106
On February 27, 2004, 9 years after the Basel Ban, the Philippines
ratified the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs
Convention).107 The POPs Convention was designed to end the production
and use of persistent organic pollutants (POPs).
The Convention has specific “anti-trade” provisions as it restricts
export and import of POPs and POPs’ wastes.108 The Convention also
defines how the international community must manage POPs wastes,
particularly the need to take appropriate measures so that these wastes are,
disposed of in such a way that the POPs pollutant content is “destroyed or
irreversibly transformed” so that it no longer possesses the characteristics
of a POP.
At the WTO level there is room for even the “anti-trade” measures
under the Montreal Protocol and POPs Convention. The WTO recognizes
that the principle of free trade is not absolute and is limited by a country’s
need to protect human health and the environment. This is embodied in the
chapeau of Article XX and in subparagraph (b) of GATT 1994, which
provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:

The Montreal Protocol, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/montreal_
protocol.php. The Protocol has been modified five times since its adoption in 1987 by subsequent
agreements in London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), Vienna (1995), Montreal (1997), and Beijing
(1999). Id. The Philippines has ratified all the modifications. Id.
105. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 104, art. 2.
106. Montreal Protocol, supra note 104, art. 4.
107. Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention, Stockholm Convention – Status of Ratifications,
STOCKHOLM CONVENTION, http://chm.pops.int/Countries/Statusof Ratifications/tabid/252/Default.aspx
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
108. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants art. 3, May 22, 2001, 2256 U.N.T.S.
119, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202256/v2256.pdf [hereinafter
POPs Convention].
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x xx
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
x xx
Considering that the Philippines ratified MEAs with “anti-trade”

elements, and the WTO’s own recognition and allowance of trade
bans under specific circumstances,109 it appears that the argument
against the Basel Ban as an “anti-trade” measure is not a major
factor for the Philippines government.
2. Economic Development / Supply of Raw Material. The economic
development argument posits that recycling industries need raw materials
for their facilities, and if the supply of raw materials is interrupted or
stopped, this could adversely affect the industry and could result in
dislocation of laborers, lowered income, further environmental degradation
and flight of investments. Thus, the Basel Ban, as an “anti-trade” measure
is an impediment to hazardous raw materials, particularly those coming
from Annex VII (developed countries).
The focus of this article is not to prove or disprove the economic value
of the Philippine hazardous waste recycling industry, but to focus on a
specific element key to the economic argument, and that is supply of raw
materials.
In 1994, the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) released Administrative Order No. 28 on the Interim
Guidelines for the Importation of Recyclable Materials Containing
Hazardous Substances (AO 28).110
AO 28 affirms the country’s
commitment to the Basel Convention, but upon approval of the DENR, will
allow into the country the following wastes for “recovery, recycling and
reprocessing:”
i. scrap metals (including used lead-acid batteries and metal bearing
sludge)
ii. solid plastic materials
iii. electronic assemblies and scraps111

109. For a discussion of the WTO Article XX (b) and (g) rules please see: WTO Rules and
Environmental Policies: GATT Exceptions, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm (last visited April 19, 2014).
110. D.E.N.R. Admin. Ord. No. 28 (1994) (Phil.), available at http://www.emb.gov.ph
/laws/toxic%20substances%20and%20hazardous%20wastes/dao94-28.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2014)
[hereinafter AO28].
111. Id. at Annex A.
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The exemption given to these classes of wastes raises a presumption
that Executive Department deemed it important for the country to allow
entry of these wastes in a controlled manner. We focus our attention on the
supply of ULABs and electronic assemblies and scraps (e-waste). Note
that these are both hazardous wastes under the Basel Convention, and are
within the ambit of the Basel Ban.112
i. Supply of ULABs. The Philippine Association of Battery
Manufacturer’s Inc. (PABMA) produces over 5 million standard battery
units (SBUs) and provides employment to nearly 15,000.113
PABMA is also one of the staunchest opponents of the Basel Ban
because of the threat of a possible disruption in the supply of lead to its
members. Its membership needs 6,436 metric tons of ULABs every month
to maintain the 5 million car batteries per month it can produce. There is an
estimated domestic supply of about 3,300 metric tons of ULABs in the
Philippines per month. With the domestic supply insufficient to cover the
production needs, a shortfall of 3,136 metric tons per month or an annual
shortfall of almost 38,000 metric tons needs to be met.114 Further, since the
Philippines does not have any primary source of lead, PABMA members
are dependent on foreign sources of lead.
The United Nations Comtrade data base115 contains a listing of the
legal trade of commodities traded around the globe, including ULABs.
Looking at the Philippine imports of ULABs for the past 13 years a picture
emerges, see table below.
112. Basel Convention, supra note 18, Annex VIII, available at http://www.basel.int/Portals/
4/Basel%20Convention/docs/text/BaselConventionText-e.pdf#page=73. The Basel Convention
identifies ULABs as hazardous waste under Annex VIII, List A, A1160 Waste lead-acid batteries,
whole or scrap. Id. E-waste is identified also in the same annex as A1180 waste electrical and
electronic assemblies or scrap containing, components such as accumulators and other batteries
included on list A, mercury-switches, activated glass cullets from cathode-ray tubes and other activated
glass and PCB-capacitors, or contaminated with Schedule 2 constituents (e.g. cadmium, mercury, lead,
polychlorinated biphenyl) to an extent that they exhibit hazard characteristics indicated in part C of this
Schedule (refer B1110). Id.
113. Ateneo School of Government, Demystifying the Impacts of a Basel Ban Amendment
Ratification by the Philippines (2014), draft and unpublished, at 34 [hereinafter ASOG Study].
114. Id.
115. The United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) contains detailed
imports and exports statistics reported by statistical authorities of close to 200 countries or areas. United
Nations Statistics Division—Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE), UN COMTRADE,
http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). It concerns annual trade data from
1962 to the most recent year.
Read Me First, UN COMTRADE, http://comtrade.un.org/
db/help/uReadMeFirst.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). Note the table was generated by using the
following parameters: click “imports” under the “SHOW” box; typing in the HS Code 854810 only, as
legal trade of ULABs should fall under this code; indicating the applicable years for the search “in the
year” box; indicating “Philippines” in the “TO” box; specifying an exporting country in the “FROM”
box, e.g. Thailand; and selecting “any” in the classification box.
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Year

Import (kg)

2000

2005

12,356
336
Total 12,692
26,273
Total 26,273
207,000
10,500
Total 217,500
689,360
292,518
19,380
Total 1,001,258
160,740

2006

Total160,740
119,704

2001
2002

2004

2007
2008

2009

2010

Total119,704
3,385,877
Total 3,385,877
150,000
6,210,905
111,136
1,272,770
758,134
Total 8,502,945
1,700,440
9
6,512
Total1,706,961
106,730
35,640
438,015
2,220,515

Exporting
Country
Malaysia
Thailand
Thailand
Bulgaria
Thailand
Bulgaria
Malaysia
Thailand
Papua
Guinea

New

Papua
Guinea

New

Sri Lanka
China
New Zealand
Papua
New
Guinea
Singapore
Sri Lanka
New Zealand
Singapore
United States of
America
Australia
China, Hong Kong
SAR
New Zealand
Singapore
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447,050

2011

2012

401,725
Total 3,649,675
62,858
7,079
395,630
4,441,725
8,339,402
Total 13,246,694
3,000
43,000
109,520
18,332
7,231,111
97,920
68

United
Emirates
Viet Nam

Arab

China
Indonesia
New Zealand
Singapore
United
Arab
Emirates
China
Indonesia
New Zealand
Republic of Korea
Singapore
United
Arab
Emirates
United States of
America

Total 7,502,951
The data suggests that in the past 13 years the Philippines imported
39,533,270 kgs of ULABs from various nations, developed and
developing. Developing country exports to the Philippines totalled
30,547,118 kgs, comprising 77% of total ULAB imports into the country.
Compared to 8,986,152 kgs, 23% of total imports, coming from developed
nations (majority of the ULABs came from New Zealand).
The above data confirms a changing trend in both hazardous waste
generation and trade. In the 1990s when the Basel Ban was born a majority
of developed nations generated hazardous wastes. At least the above
ULAB trade data shows developing nations are increasing their generation
and trade as well.
The Basel Convention released a report in 2010 confirming the
change in the overall hazardous waste generation and trade. For instance
their data shows that trade between Annex VII to Non-Annex VII states
from 2004 to 2006 decreased by 73%. The Basel Convention report also
explains the decrease in relation to the Basel Ban:
[T]he data as reported does suggest that exports that would come
under the Ban Amendment are limited in number, amount and seem to be
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decreasing. . . .
Lead and lead compounds are also moved in relatively large amounts
between non-Annex VII countries. Most likely these are lead-acid batteries
that are generated in a large number of non-Annex VII countries that do not
have recycling facilities for the lead and that are recycled in a limited
number of non-Annex VII countries. In particular, the Philippines recycles
lead acid batteries from a number of Asian non-Annex VII
countries . . . .116
ii. E-waste Supply. Unlike ULABs, there are no e-waste associations
in the Philippines who can share production data and raw materials
requirements. To approximate raw material demand a study conducted by
the Ateneo School of Government looked at the official e-waste
importation permitted by the Department of Environment from 2001 to
2005 and found that Japan and China were the top source of e-wastes
imported into the Philippines.117 Presumably the e-waste demand is to
recover precious metals found in e-waste such as gold, copper, etc. to
supply the needs of local the local electronics assembly industry or for
further export as there are no smelters in the country that would need
further supply of metals.
The study extrapolated the e-waste raw material’s need of recycling
industries in the country based on the quantity of imports for the period.
According to the study the Philippine e-waste recycling industry demand
could run in the range of 11,000 to 28,000 kgs, based on the available data.
Thus, to maintain the facilities the industry would need to be ensured of a
steady supply of e-waste in the above amount.
To look at possible supply sources, the study turned its attention to
domestic e-waste where an estimate was made that by 2015 there would be
approximately 4 million tons of e-waste generated in the Philippines. The
study further concludes that the estimated local e-waste would be more
than enough to cover the shortfall from a possible import prohibition from
Annex VII countries like Japan.
Given the ULAB and e-waste scenarios above, from a strict supply
perspective, the threat of supply disruption in the face of the Basel Ban
appears to be minimal. Thus, the economic argument against the Basel
Ban appears to be out of date in light of the historical trade data shown and
the changing trend in hazardous waste generation and trade as confirmed
by the Basel Convention.

116. Kees Wielenga, SECRETARIAT OF THE BASEL CONVENTION, WASTE WITHOUT FRONTIERS 16
(2010), available at http://archive.basel.int/pub/ww-frontiers31Jan2010.pdf.
117. ASOG Study, supra note 113, at 39.
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3. Difficulty of Implementing the Basel Ban. The argument that the
Basel Ban will be difficult to implement has two components: a) because
major developing countries such as the US are not supporting it, and b) the
requirement of financial, technical and human resources to implement the
ban.
i. Not supported by US and other hazardous waste generating
countries. At the start a distinction needs to be made between parties and
non-parties to the Basel Convention. The US is in a special category all of
its own as it is the only developed nation that is not party to the Basel
Convention.118 As a non-party, the Basel Convention prohibits waste trade
between parties and non-parties, thus, the US as a general rule will not be
allowed to trade with a country that is party to Basel, regardless whether
that party has ratified the Basel Ban or not.
For the US to legally trade hazardous wastes to Basel parties, it will
need to enter an agreement that is fully compliant with Article 11 of
Basel.119 These agreements must not derogate from the environmentally
sound management of hazardous wastes as required by the Convention, or
stipulate provisions, which are less stringent than those under Basel.120
Therefore, the US in order to legally trade with a Basel party will need to
comply with the importing country’s laws as it relates to the Basel
Convention.
In a situation where it ratifies the Basel Ban, as a developing country
the Philippines will modify its hazardous waste law in line with the
principle of pacta sunt servanda.121 The main element that it will need to
transpose in its national law is an explicit prohibition against hazardous
waste imports similar to the Basel Ban. After it modifies its local law, the
government must report and notify the Basel Secretariat of these changes,
which then puts all Basel parties on notice that the Philippines has effected
a Basel Ban import prohibition, which will thereafter influence hazardous
waste exports particularly from developed countries.122 For instance, AO
28 on exemptions to e-waste and ULABs will need to be revisited and
realigned with the Basel Ban obligations.
118. See Signatories to Basel Convention, supra note 21 (noting that the United States has signed,
but not yet ratified, the Convention, unlike many other developed countries that have, including France,
Germany, etc.).
119. See Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 11(1) (explaining when parties to the Convention
may make agreements with other parties and non-parties regarding the movement of wastes).
120. Id.
121. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 26–27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20115 5/v1155.pdf.
122. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 13(2).
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Thus, even though the US is not a party to the Basel Ban,123 if it were
to attempt to trade with a country that has ratified the Basel Ban, the
importing country under Article 11 of Basel and under the principle of
pacta sunt servanda must ensure that agreements it makes with the US
comply with its Basel Convention and Basel Ban obligations.
The same process will apply to other developed nations party to Basel
that may wish to trade with other Parties that have ratified the Basel Ban.
In the case of the Philippines, for instance, if New Zealand exports ULABs
to the Philippines, and the latter has ratified the Basel Ban and eliminates
the ULAB exemption under AO 28, New Zealand is obligated under the
Basel Convention to respect Philippine regulations that implement the
latter’s Basel Ban obligations.
In the above scenario, even if the developed nations opposed to the
Basel Ban do not support it, the domestic law implementation of the Basel
Ban in the importing states could prevent or make it difficult for these
nations to trade their hazardous wastes. In spite their opposition to the
Basel Ban.
ii. Financial, Manpower and Technical Costs. Developing countries
are often concerned about the costs of implementing treaty obligations.
The Basel Ban is not immune to these concerns.
The critical difference with the Basel Ban, however, is that Annex VII
exporting countries will bear the additional costs of implementation and
not necessarily the developing countries.124 Note that the obligation to
“prohibit” falls with the Annex VII countries. The act of prohibiting
necessarily entails a policy shift within the Annex VII state, and the
corresponding enforcement of the policy.
This is also in line with the recognition that developed nations are
better equipped to monitor and enforce hazardous waste controls.125
CONCLUSION
International environmental justice continues to be an ideal that is
elusive and one that developing countries are still struggling for. Nineteen
years after its adoption, the Basel Ban, an instrument that strengthens
123. Signatories to Basel Convention, supra note 21.
124. See Basel Ban, supra note 81, at ¶ 1 (noting that at previous Conference, a “request was made
for the prohibition of hazardous waste shipments from industrialized countries to developing
countries”).
125. See Basel Ban, supra note 80, § 3 (noting that “transboundary movements of hazardous
wastes, especially to developing countries, have a high risk of not constituting an environmentally
sound management of hazardous waste as required by this Convention”).
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environmental justice at the global level, is still a paper tiger.
The Philippine situation, however, has shown that a lot of the
perceived weaknesses surrounding the Basel Ban no longer holds true. As
an anti-trade measure, not only have countries, such as the Philippines,
acceded to other MEAs that have “anti-trade” measures such as the Basel
Ban, but the WTO itself recognizes certain limits to trade through its
GATT XX(b) provision.
The argument that the Basel Ban will be a hindrance to formal
recycling because of the obstacle it places on “raw materials” supply
appears to no longer hold water as well. The concern over the lack of
support by the US, Japan and other members of JUSCANZ will not
necessarily make the Basel Ban difficult to implement. Almost all the
nations in the world are parties to the Basel Convention now. Thus,
countries that ratify the Basel Ban can affect Basel Convention parties
when the former realign their domestic laws to comply with the Basel Ban.
The Basel Ban has and always been a developing country-driven and
motivated instrument.
The Basel Ban will not come about by
happenstance. Each ratification that the Basel Ban garners in the coming
years must be a clear demand from developing countries for international
environmental justice. Rhetoric has no place in this endeavor. To achieve
this, developing countries must re-examine their position vis-à-vis the
Basel Ban, and go beyond the myths that have straddled the issue for so
long.
Countries, both developed and developing, must also begin a critical
examination of how they apply environmental justice within their borders.
The strength of a country’s international policy on any given issue, such as
environmental justice, is derived from the strength of its own domestic
policy. And perhaps, this is the only obstacle left unexamined for those
countries waiting to ratify the Basel Ban.

